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Loyalty Program Data in Advertising: a consent architecture for US, EU and UK programs
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Loyalty program advertising works when the consent design matches the data flow. In most US states, member data can feed ads with notice and an opt-out, but incentives, sales and sensitive data need more. In the EU and UK, a lawful basis per purpose and device consent decide. Keep records inside; release only segments and aggregates.
Contents
Key facts
- California treats a loyalty program as a financial incentive. A business may enrol a consumer only with prior opt-in consent that describes the material terms and can be revoked (Cal. Civ. Code 1798.125(b)(3), CCPA text effective 1 January 2026). The notice must include a good-faith estimate of the value of the consumer's data (11 CCR 7016).
- Data co-ops count as a sale. DoorDash paid $375,000 after California said its customer data, contributed to a marketing co-operative, was sold without notice or an opt-out (California AG, 21 February 2024).
- Opt-out signals are enforced. Sephora paid $1.2 million in 2022 partly for ignoring Global Privacy Control signals; the same release described a sweep of loyalty programs that lacked a notice of financial incentive (California AG, 24 August 2022).
- Twenty states have comprehensive privacy laws. Mayer Brown's tracker counted 20 as of 3 September 2026 (Mayer Brown, 3 September 2026).
- The UK named direct marketing as a legitimate interest. UK GDPR Article 6(11)(a), added by the Data (Use and Access) Act 2025, has been fully in force since 5 February 2026 (legislation.gov.uk, UK GDPR Art. 6).
- EU members can stop marketing outright. Under GDPR Article 21(3), once a person objects to direct marketing, their data "shall no longer be processed for such purposes" (GDPR Art. 21).
Definition
Consent architecture for loyalty data: the notices, consent records, data rules, export controls and suppression steps that decide, per member and per use, whether loyalty data may serve advertising and in what form it may leave the program owner.
The phrase "first party data monetization" usually means this decision. A retailer's version is described in Shopper data monetization; bank, airline, hotel and carrier programs are listed in the commerce media networks directory, under the commerce media hub. The architecture below applies to all of them.
Step one: decide which use you mean
Most consent mistakes start with a vague purpose such as "personalised marketing". Advertising with loyalty data is at least five separate uses, and the law treats them differently.
5 of 5 rows
| Owner targets members with its own offers in its app, site or email | Nothing | Privacy notice; email and SMS marketing rules; GDPR basis in the EU and UK |
| Owner selects members to see a brand's ad on the owner's surfaces | An aggregate report to the brand | Disclosure to the brand is avoided; profiling notice and opt-outs still apply |
| Owner sends a segment to another platform to show ads elsewhere | A segment ID, or member identifiers such as hashed emails | Often "sale" or "sharing" under US state law; GDPR basis and device consent in the EU and UK |
| Owner and brand compare customers in a clean room | Aggregate overlap and lift results | Depends on whether row-level data reaches the brand; contracts and controller roles |
| Brand funds a reward; owner matches purchases | Redemption counts and sales reports | Financial privacy rules if the owner is a bank; incentive rules if it is a retailer |
- Own marketing on owned channels
- What happens to member data
Owner targets members with its own offers in its app, site or email
- What leaves the program owner
Nothing
- Typical legal trigger
Privacy notice; email and SMS marketing rules; GDPR basis in the EU and UK
- Onsite ads for other brands
- What happens to member data
Owner selects members to see a brand's ad on the owner's surfaces
- What leaves the program owner
An aggregate report to the brand
- Typical legal trigger
Disclosure to the brand is avoided; profiling notice and opt-outs still apply
- Offsite audiences
- What happens to member data
Owner sends a segment to another platform to show ads elsewhere
- What leaves the program owner
A segment ID, or member identifiers such as hashed emails
- Typical legal trigger
Often "sale" or "sharing" under US state law; GDPR basis and device consent in the EU and UK
- Data collaboration
- What happens to member data
Owner and brand compare customers in a clean room
- What leaves the program owner
Aggregate overlap and lift results
- Typical legal trigger
Depends on whether row-level data reaches the brand; contracts and controller roles
- Card-linked or merchant-funded offers
- What happens to member data
Brand funds a reward; owner matches purchases
- What leaves the program owner
Redemption counts and sales reports
- Typical legal trigger
Financial privacy rules if the owner is a bank; incentive rules if it is a retailer
Table by AdSovereign, CC BY 4.0.
Card-linked offers are covered in depth in Card-linked offers explained. The other four uses are the subject of this page.
What consent model each jurisdiction expects
United States: notice and opt-out, with opt-in for the hard cases
US state privacy laws give consumers rights to opt out of the sale of personal data and of targeted advertising, and most require opt-in consent for sensitive data. The details differ by state, and Mayer Brown's tracker lists 20 states with comprehensive laws as of 3 September 2026 (Mayer Brown).
California is the strictest for loyalty programs. Its law lets a business offer rewards for personal data, but only with prior opt-in consent, a clear notice of the terms and a right to withdraw. It also bars incentive practices that are "unjust, unreasonable, coercive, or usurious" (Cal. Civ. Code 1798.125(b)). The required Notice of Financial Incentive must list the categories of data involved and explain how the price or service difference relates to the value of the member's data (11 CCR 7016).
Three more California rules shape loyalty advertising:
- Sharing. Disclosing personal data to a third party for cross-context behavioural advertising is "sharing", with or without payment (1798.140(ah)). Sending a member list to an ad platform to target those members elsewhere fits this definition.
- Opt-out signals. A business that sells or shares data must treat a valid opt-out preference signal, such as an HTTP header, as an opt-out request (11 CCR 7025(b)).
- Symmetry. A sign-up flow that pre-selects joining a financial incentive program, or makes it more prominent than declining, is not a symmetrical choice. Silence does not count as consent (CCPA Regulations § 7004, text effective 1 January 2026).
Enforcement shows where regulators look. California's Attorney General listed a sweep of loyalty programs without incentive notices in its August 2022 Sephora release, and the Sephora settlement itself turned on Global Privacy Control (California AG, 24 August 2022). The DoorDash case concerned a marketing co-operative in which businesses swap customer data to advertise to each other's customers. Disney paid $2.75 million in 2026 over opt-outs that did not apply across its services (California AG enforcement list, accessed 9 November 2026).
Health inferences raise the bar further. A shopping history can reveal a health condition. Washington's My Health My Data Act requires consent to collect consumer health data, a separate consent to share it, and a signed authorization to sell it (RCW 19.373.030; RCW 19.373.070). Other states' health rules are compared in the state health privacy laws tracker. If the program is run by a bank, GLBA and Regulation P apply first; see Bank advertising rules.
European Union: a lawful basis per purpose, and consent for devices
Under the GDPR, each advertising use needs its own lawful basis, usually consent (Article 6(1)(a)) or legitimate interest (Article 6(1)(f)) (GDPR, EUR-Lex). Recital 47 says direct marketing "may be regarded" as a legitimate interest. That helps use 1, the owner marketing its own products. It does not decide uses 2 to 4, where a third-party brand benefits, and a balancing test is still required.
The right to object is absolute for direct marketing. Once a member objects, their data must no longer be processed for that purpose, including profiling linked to it (GDPR Art. 21(2)-(3)). In July 2023 the Court of Justice read Article 6(1) narrowly for personalised advertising on a large platform (CJEU C-252/21, Meta v Bundeskartellamt). Purchase data that reveals health, religion or other special categories falls under Article 9, which in practice means explicit consent or exclusion.
The ePrivacy Directive adds two rules. Reading or writing on a member's device, through cookies, pixels or SDKs, needs consent unless strictly necessary (Art. 5(3)). A company that got an email address in the course of a sale may use it without fresh consent only to market its own similar products, with an easy way to object each time (Art. 13(2)). The Digital Omnibus proposal may change the cookie rule, but no text was adopted by 9 November 2026 (Taylor Wessing, 2026). The bidstream side is covered in GDPR, ePrivacy and the TCF.
United Kingdom: what changed in 2026
The UK kept the GDPR structure but changed two things that matter here. Since 5 February 2026, UK GDPR Article 6(11)(a) lists processing "necessary for the purposes of direct marketing" as an example of a legitimate interest (legislation.gov.uk, UK GDPR Art. 6). It is an example, not an exemption: the balancing test and the right to object remain. The new "recognised legitimate interests" in Annex 1 do not include marketing.
Electronic marketing still follows PECR. The soft opt-in covers a company's own similar products, with a simple way to refuse at collection and in every message (PECR reg. 22); the 2025 Act extended a version of it to charities from 5 February 2026. Cookies and SDKs follow PECR regulation 6 and the ICO's guidance on storage and access technologies. The full list of changes is in the UK Data (Use and Access) Act and advertising.
The three regimes side by side
5 of 5 rows
| Notice; incentive opt-in if data earns rewards; email and SMS rules | Legitimate interest possible (Recital 47) with Art. 21 objection; Art. 13(2) soft opt-in for email | Art. 6(11)(a) example of legitimate interest; PECR reg. 22 soft opt-in |
| Notice; opt-out of targeted advertising where the state grants it | Lawful basis with balancing or consent; Art. 5(3) consent if device data is read | Same structure as EU; PECR reg. 6 for device data |
| Usually "sale" or "sharing": notice, opt-out, honour opt-out signals; opt-in for sensitive data | Consent is the common basis in practice; Art. 5(3) consent for device IDs | Consent common in practice; PECR reg. 6 |
| Depends on whether row-level data reaches the brand; contracts | Controller roles and Art. 26 if joint; aggregate outputs | Same as EU |
Sensitive or health inferences | Opt-in in most states; MHMDA consent and authorization in Washington | Art. 9 explicit consent or exclusion | Art. 9 UK GDPR |
- Own marketing, owned channels
- US (California as the strictest common case)
Notice; incentive opt-in if data earns rewards; email and SMS rules
- EU
Legitimate interest possible (Recital 47) with Art. 21 objection; Art. 13(2) soft opt-in for email
- UK
Art. 6(11)(a) example of legitimate interest; PECR reg. 22 soft opt-in
- Onsite ads for other brands
- US (California as the strictest common case)
Notice; opt-out of targeted advertising where the state grants it
- EU
Lawful basis with balancing or consent; Art. 5(3) consent if device data is read
- UK
Same structure as EU; PECR reg. 6 for device data
- Offsite audiences
- US (California as the strictest common case)
Usually "sale" or "sharing": notice, opt-out, honour opt-out signals; opt-in for sensitive data
- EU
Consent is the common basis in practice; Art. 5(3) consent for device IDs
- UK
Consent common in practice; PECR reg. 6
- Clean room collaboration
- US (California as the strictest common case)
Depends on whether row-level data reaches the brand; contracts
- EU
Controller roles and Art. 26 if joint; aggregate outputs
- UK
Same as EU
Sensitive or health inferences
- US (California as the strictest common case)
Opt-in in most states; MHMDA consent and authorization in Washington
- EU
Art. 9 explicit consent or exclusion
- UK
Art. 9 UK GDPR
Table by AdSovereign, CC BY 4.0.
The consent architecture in five layers
The architecture below is practice, not a legal requirement. It is the pattern behind the live networks that say advertisers receive no personal data.
- Notices. A privacy notice that names advertising uses; program terms; a Notice of Financial Incentive where California law applies; a value estimate for the data. Each notice has a version number.
- Consent and preference store. One record per member per purpose: own marketing, onsite third-party ads, offsite audiences, data collaboration, email and SMS. Each record holds the state, the notice version shown, the time, the channel and any opt-out signal received.
- Data rules and segment-only export. Raw transactions stay inside. Segments are built from derived attributes, carry a minimum size and the consent flags they require, and leave only as segment IDs.
- Clean room for collaboration. Brands bring their own data. Queries return aggregates above thresholds, and every query is logged. The clean room options are compared in Clean room architectures compared.
- Suppression and propagation. Opt-outs, objections, deletions, minors and sensitive categories flow to every downstream system within a set time, including partners that already hold segment IDs.
What can and cannot leave the perimeter
7 of 7 rows
Raw transactions and baskets | No, in this architecture | Not exported | Analysed inside only |
Member name, email, phone | Only with a lawful route | Hashed identifiers for matching | US: treated as sale or sharing in most cases; EU and UK: still personal data when hashed |
Segment ID ("lapsed coffee buyers") | Yes | ID plus segment size | Consent flags checked; minimum size; no sensitive categories |
Aggregate results (overlap, lift, sales) | Yes | Counts and rates above a threshold | Thresholds stop re-identification of small groups |
Health or other sensitive inferences | No, unless specific consent | Usually excluded | MHMDA consent and authorization; GDPR Art. 9 |
Payment card numbers | No | Tokens only, inside | Regulation P bars banks from disclosing account numbers for marketing (12 CFR 1016.12) |
Device identifiers and cookies | Only with consent where required | IDs passed to an owned or partner bidder | EU and UK consent for device access; US opt-out of targeted ads |
Raw transactions and baskets
- Can it leave?
No, in this architecture
- In what form
Not exported
- What has to be true
Analysed inside only
Member name, email, phone
- Can it leave?
Only with a lawful route
- In what form
Hashed identifiers for matching
- What has to be true
US: treated as sale or sharing in most cases; EU and UK: still personal data when hashed
Segment ID ("lapsed coffee buyers")
- Can it leave?
Yes
- In what form
ID plus segment size
- What has to be true
Consent flags checked; minimum size; no sensitive categories
Aggregate results (overlap, lift, sales)
- Can it leave?
Yes
- In what form
Counts and rates above a threshold
- What has to be true
Thresholds stop re-identification of small groups
Health or other sensitive inferences
- Can it leave?
No, unless specific consent
- In what form
Usually excluded
- What has to be true
MHMDA consent and authorization; GDPR Art. 9
Payment card numbers
- Can it leave?
No
- In what form
Tokens only, inside
- What has to be true
Regulation P bars banks from disclosing account numbers for marketing (12 CFR 1016.12)
Device identifiers and cookies
- Can it leave?
Only with consent where required
- In what form
IDs passed to an owned or partner bidder
- What has to be true
EU and UK consent for device access; US opt-out of targeted ads
Table by AdSovereign, CC BY 4.0.
A hashed email is a matching key, not anonymous data. In the EU and UK it remains personal data, and in California a hashed list sent to an ad platform for targeting fits the definition of sharing.
Practice: how live programs describe their consent
These are company statements, not legal findings, and they show the pattern.
United (MileagePlus). Kinective uses "aggregated and anonymized" segments, gives advertisers no personal data, and lets US customers opt out (United, 7 June 2024).
Marriott (Bonvoy). Marriott calls its media platform "consent-based, with easy opt-out options" (Hospitality Net, 12 June 2025).
Revolut. Ads appear only in a dedicated shopping section and only for customers who opt in to third-party marketing (The Media Leader, 2023).
CVS Media Exchange (ExtraCare). CVS joins loyalty members to platform users through clean rooms with Pinterest and Reddit, without passing identifiable data, and builds audiences on front-store purchases, not prescriptions (Beet.TV, 16 July 2025).
Cardlytics. The platform says its network analyses bank purchase data "without any personal data leaving" the bank, through an ad server hosted at the bank or on its behalf (Cardlytics 10-K, FY2025).
T-Mobile and Verizon. Both carriers split programs into opt-out tiers on app and browsing data and opt-in tiers that use network data (T-Mobile, 26 June 2026; Verizon, October 2026). The carrier version is explained in Telecom media networks.
Decision guide: choose the lightest architecture that fits
Work through these questions in order. Each answer narrows the design; none of them replaces a review of your own facts.
- Is any of the data sensitive, or could it reveal health, religion, sexuality or finances? If yes, exclude those categories from advertising, or plan for opt-in consent and, in Washington, a signed authorization (RCW 19.373.070). Most programs exclude.
- Where do members live? If any live in California, check whether the program is a financial incentive and whether offsite use is sharing. If any live in the EU or UK, map a lawful basis to each of the five uses.
- Does a third-party brand benefit? If no, you are in use 1, and notice plus the right to object usually carries it. If yes, move to question 4.
- Does anything identifiable leave? If only aggregates and segment IDs leave, design for onsite ads and clean-room results. If hashed identifiers leave for offsite targeting, treat it as sale or sharing in the US and plan for consent in the EU and UK.
- How will you prove what happened? Buyers and auditors will ask which members saw which ad and on what basis. If you cannot answer from logs, fix that before launch.
Four common outcomes follow. Owned-channel marketing needs the notice, consent store and suppression layers. Onsite ads for brands add segment-only export. Data collaboration adds the clean room. Offsite activation with identifiers needs all five layers and carries the heaviest consent burden.
A worked example: one grocery program, three markets
Take a grocery chain with members in California, Texas and the Netherlands. A cereal brand wants to reach lapsed buyers of its products, first on the grocer's app and then on other sites. The scenario is illustrative; the rules it applies are cited above.
Onsite first. The grocer builds a "lapsed cereal buyers" segment inside its own systems from basket data. The brand's ad appears in the grocer's app to members in that segment. The brand receives impressions, clicks and a sales report, not names. In Texas and California the main questions are notice, the targeted-advertising opt-out and, in California, whether the rewards program has its financial incentive notice. In the Netherlands the grocer needs a lawful basis for profiling members for a third-party brand's benefit, and an objection route.
Then offsite. The brand asks to target the same members on social media. That means hashed member emails leave the grocer. In California this is sharing, so members who opted out, or whose browsers send an opt-out signal, are removed first (11 CCR 7025). In the Netherlands the grocer would usually rely on consent collected for this purpose. Members who never gave it are left out of the upload.
What the brand learns. A clean room returns how many members saw the ad and how their purchases changed against a holdout group. No member-level rows reach the brand. The grocer can show, for each member, which segment they were in and which consent applied, which is the evidence an audit asks for.
The example shows why the same segment can clear the rules onsite and fail them offsite for the same member. Consent has to travel with the segment, not sit in a separate system.
Audit checklist: 20 checks before loyalty data feeds advertising
20 of 20 rows
1 | Each advertising use is listed separately in the privacy notice | Notice text and version history | GDPR Arts. 13-14; state notice rules |
2 | A Notice of Financial Incentive exists where California applies, with a value estimate | Notice and valuation method | 11 CCR 7016 |
3 | Joining the program is an opt-in, not a pre-ticked box | Sign-up screens | Civ. Code 1798.125(b)(3); CCPA Regs § 7004 |
4 | Consent records hold purpose, time, channel and notice version | Consent store export | GDPR Art. 7(1) |
5 | Opt-out preference signals are honoured as opt-outs of sale and sharing | Test logs with GPC on | 11 CCR 7025 |
6 | Opt-outs apply across every brand and service the member uses | Cross-service test | California AG enforcement record |
7 | Marketing objections stop all related profiling | Objection handling logs | GDPR Art. 21(2)-(3) |
8 | Email and SMS consent is separate from advertising consent | Preference centre screens | PECR reg. 22; ePrivacy Art. 13 |
9 | Cookies, pixels and SDKs fire only after consent where required | Tag audit | ePrivacy Art. 5(3); PECR reg. 6 |
10 | Sensitive and health categories are excluded or separately consented | Exclusion list | MHMDA; GDPR Art. 9 |
11 | Raw transactions are not exported to brands | Data-flow diagram, egress logs | Architecture rule |
12 | Segments have a minimum size and a written definition | Segment registry | Architecture rule |
13 | Each segment carries the consent flags it needs | Registry fields | Architecture rule |
14 | Hashed identifiers are treated as personal data | Data map | GDPR Art. 4; Civ. Code 1798.140(ah) |
15 | No data co-op or list swap runs outside the notice | Contract review | California AG, DoorDash |
16 | Clean-room outputs are aggregates above a threshold | Clean room settings, query log | Architecture rule |
17 | Every partner contract limits use to the stated purpose | Executed contracts | CCPA contract terms; GDPR Art. 28 |
18 | Deletions and opt-outs reach partners within a set time | Propagation logs | CCPA; GDPR Art. 17 |
19 | Ad delivery logs show which segment and consent state applied | Sample log | Accountability |
20 | The design is reviewed when a new state law takes effect | Review calendar | State law tracker |
1
- Check
Each advertising use is listed separately in the privacy notice
- Evidence an auditor asks for
Notice text and version history
- Rule it maps to
GDPR Arts. 13-14; state notice rules
2
- Check
A Notice of Financial Incentive exists where California applies, with a value estimate
- Evidence an auditor asks for
Notice and valuation method
- Rule it maps to
11 CCR 7016
3
- Check
Joining the program is an opt-in, not a pre-ticked box
- Evidence an auditor asks for
Sign-up screens
- Rule it maps to
Civ. Code 1798.125(b)(3); CCPA Regs § 7004
4
- Check
Consent records hold purpose, time, channel and notice version
- Evidence an auditor asks for
Consent store export
- Rule it maps to
GDPR Art. 7(1)
5
- Check
Opt-out preference signals are honoured as opt-outs of sale and sharing
- Evidence an auditor asks for
Test logs with GPC on
- Rule it maps to
11 CCR 7025
6
- Check
Opt-outs apply across every brand and service the member uses
- Evidence an auditor asks for
Cross-service test
- Rule it maps to
California AG enforcement record
7
- Check
Marketing objections stop all related profiling
- Evidence an auditor asks for
Objection handling logs
- Rule it maps to
GDPR Art. 21(2)-(3)
8
- Check
Email and SMS consent is separate from advertising consent
- Evidence an auditor asks for
Preference centre screens
- Rule it maps to
PECR reg. 22; ePrivacy Art. 13
9
- Check
Cookies, pixels and SDKs fire only after consent where required
- Evidence an auditor asks for
Tag audit
- Rule it maps to
ePrivacy Art. 5(3); PECR reg. 6
10
- Check
Sensitive and health categories are excluded or separately consented
- Evidence an auditor asks for
Exclusion list
- Rule it maps to
MHMDA; GDPR Art. 9
11
- Check
Raw transactions are not exported to brands
- Evidence an auditor asks for
Data-flow diagram, egress logs
- Rule it maps to
Architecture rule
12
- Check
Segments have a minimum size and a written definition
- Evidence an auditor asks for
Segment registry
- Rule it maps to
Architecture rule
13
- Check
Each segment carries the consent flags it needs
- Evidence an auditor asks for
Registry fields
- Rule it maps to
Architecture rule
14
- Check
Hashed identifiers are treated as personal data
- Evidence an auditor asks for
Data map
- Rule it maps to
GDPR Art. 4; Civ. Code 1798.140(ah)
15
- Check
No data co-op or list swap runs outside the notice
- Evidence an auditor asks for
Contract review
- Rule it maps to
California AG, DoorDash
16
- Check
Clean-room outputs are aggregates above a threshold
- Evidence an auditor asks for
Clean room settings, query log
- Rule it maps to
Architecture rule
17
- Check
Every partner contract limits use to the stated purpose
- Evidence an auditor asks for
Executed contracts
- Rule it maps to
CCPA contract terms; GDPR Art. 28
18
- Check
Deletions and opt-outs reach partners within a set time
- Evidence an auditor asks for
Propagation logs
- Rule it maps to
CCPA; GDPR Art. 17
19
- Check
Ad delivery logs show which segment and consent state applied
- Evidence an auditor asks for
Sample log
- Rule it maps to
Accountability
20
- Check
The design is reviewed when a new state law takes effect
- Evidence an auditor asks for
Review calendar
- Rule it maps to
State law tracker
Table by AdSovereign, CC BY 4.0.
Common failure modes
- Consent buried in program terms. A rewards sign-up that bundles advertising consent with membership fails California's symmetry rule if declining is harder than joining (CCPA Regulations § 7004).
- Opt-out signals ignored. Sephora's settlement turned on Global Privacy Control (California AG, 24 August 2022).
- Data leaving through a side door. DoorDash's data went through a marketing co-op and on to a data broker that resold it (California AG).
- Health hidden in baskets. Pharmacy networks build audiences on front-store purchases and keep prescriptions out, as CVS describes (Beet.TV, 16 July 2025).
- Soft opt-in stretched too far. The email exemption covers the sender's own similar products, not a partner brand's ads (PECR reg. 22).
FAQ
Can a loyalty program sell member data to advertisers?
Do I need consent to use loyalty data for targeted ads?
Is a hashed email list anonymous?
What is a notice of financial incentive?
How do card-linked offers fit into loyalty consent?
What changed in the UK in 2026?
How this works on owned infrastructure
The decision on this page is how much loyalty data has to leave to earn advertising revenue. The answer is usually segment IDs and aggregates, provided consent is checked where the data lives. AdSovereign is designed so that the consent store, the segment builder, the clean room and the suppression bus run on the program owner's own servers, next to the member database. Each segment carries the consent flags it was built from, and an opt-out or objection reaches every segment before the next campaign uses it. The architecture page shows the five layers as deployed components; the security page describes logging and egress control.
Sources
- California Privacy Protection Agency, CCPA statute text effective 1 January 2026 (Civil Code 1798.125, 1798.140, 1798.145). https://cppa.ca.gov/pdf/20260101_ccpa_statute.pdf
- California Privacy Protection Agency, CCPA Regulations, text effective 1 January 2026 (incl. § 7004). https://cppa.ca.gov/regulations/pdf/ccpa_statute_eff_20260101.pdf
- Cornell LII, Cal. Code Regs. tit. 11, § 7016, Notice of Financial Incentive (current). https://www.law.cornell.edu/regulations/california/11-CCR-7016
- Cornell LII, Cal. Code Regs. tit. 11, § 7025, Opt-out preference signals (current). https://www.law.cornell.edu/regulations/california/11-CCR-7025
- California Attorney General, "Attorney General Bonta Announces Settlement with Sephora as Part of Ongoing Enforcement of California Consumer Privacy Act" (24 August 2022). https://oag.ca.gov/news/press-releases/attorney-general-bonta-announces-settlement-sephora-part-ongoing-enforcement
- California Attorney General, Privacy Enforcement Actions (DoorDash, 21 February 2024; Disney, 11 February 2026; accessed 9 November 2026). https://oag.ca.gov/privacy/privacy-enforcement-actions
- Washington State Legislature, RCW 19.373.030 and 19.373.070 (current). https://app.leg.wa.gov/RCW/default.aspx?cite=19.373.030
- Mayer Brown, State Privacy Law Tracker (3 September 2026). https://www.mayerbrown.com/en/insights/resource-centers/cybersecurity-and-data-privacy-resource-center/state-privacy-law-tracker
- EUR-Lex, Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (GDPR). https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/oj
- legislation.gov.uk, UK GDPR Article 21 (text of Art. 21(2)-(3) identical to the EU GDPR). https://www.legislation.gov.uk/eur/2016/679/article/21
More sources (14)
- EUR-Lex, CJEU Case C-252/21, Meta Platforms v Bundeskartellamt (4 July 2023). https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:62021CJ0252
- legislation.gov.uk, Directive 2002/58/EC, Articles 5 and 13. https://www.legislation.gov.uk/eudr/2002/58/article/13
- Taylor Wessing, "The Digital Omnibus proposal: cookies" (2026). https://www.taylorwessing.com/de/global-data-hub/2026/the-digital-omnibus-proposal/gdh---the-digital-omnibus---cookies
- legislation.gov.uk, UK GDPR Article 6, as amended by the Data (Use and Access) Act 2025 (in force 5 February 2026 via S.I. 2026/82). https://www.legislation.gov.uk/eur/2016/679/article/6
- legislation.gov.uk, Privacy and Electronic Communications (EC Directive) Regulations 2003, regulations 6 and 22 (current). https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2003/2426/regulation/22
- ICO, Guidance on the use of storage and access technologies. https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/direct-marketing-and-privacy-and-electronic-communications/guidance-on-the-use-of-storage-and-access-technologies/
- United Airlines, "United Launches Airline Industry's First Media Network" (7 June 2024). https://united.mediaroom.com/2024-06-07-United-Launches-Airline-Industrys-First-Media-Network
- Hospitality Net, "Marriott International Introduces MARRIOTT MEDIA" (12 June 2025). https://www.hospitalitynet.org/news/4127669.html
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